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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

whether he was at fault in the accident. Such a no-fault compulsory insurance system would seem to close the gaps which exist under today's
plans and would afford the maximum possibility that compensation would
be provided.
After Bell the states will be forced to choose between a financial
responsibility law which is weaker than they wished or a compulsory insurance plan which is stronger than they wish. Whether the requirement of a hearing plus the effect of other recent63 or forthcoming decisions will make the laws entirely unworkable is unanswered but unlikely.
In any event, a trend toward compulsory insurance is preferable to an
amended form of financial responsibility act. Many persons have sought
to persuade legislative bodies to enact compulsory insurance laws as the
best means of providing compensation for accident victims and fulfilling
other social goals. Perhaps this decision, based on a realization that an
individual has a basic constitutional right to a hearing before suspension of
his driver's license because of application of a financial responsibility law,
can hasten this goal.
M.F.L.

LABOR

LAW-BARGAINING ORDERS-EMPLOYER KNOWLEDGE OF UNION

STRENGTH AS A BASIS FOR BARGAINING

ORDERS

IN ABSENCE OF

LABOR PRACTICES OR ELECTIONS--Summer & Co.,

UNFAIR

190 N.L.R.B. No. 116

(June 7, 1971).
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)' protects the rights of employees to organize and by a majority designation choose their representative
for collective bargaining. A union can gain recognition in three ways: the
employer can voluntarily recognize the union;2 the union can win a National
Labor Relations Board conducted election; 3 and under certain circumstances,
the Board may order the employer to bargain without an election. 4 A
bargaining order is an equitable remedy which compels the employer to
recognize and bargain with the aggrieved union. One instance in which the
Board may issue a bargaining order without an election occurs when it finds
63.

Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S. Ct. 1704 (1971).

1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
2. The employer may not even in good faith recognize a minority union.
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 81 S. Ct.
1603 (1961).

3. NLRA § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970). Winning a Board conducted election certifies the union under the Act, giving it certain advantages. Section 8(b) (4) (c)
prohibits a union from taking action directed to overthrowing an established certified
representative. Other advantages of certification are explained in General Box Co.,
82 N.L.R.B. 678 (1949).
4. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S. Ct. 1918 (1969); United
Mine Workers v. Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 76 S. Ct. 559 (1956); Franks
Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 64 S. Ct. 817 (1944). In these cases, the Court approved Board-issued bargaining orders, which compelled the employer to bargain with
a union even though it had not been certified.
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that an employer's actions have rendered a fair election impossible. 5 The

Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 6 determined that a bar-

gaining order is proper when employer unfair labor practices precluded a
fair election.

The case left undecided, however, the issue of whether or

not a bargaining order could be proper in the absence of employer misconduct. The Board has considered this undecided issue7 four times since
Gissel. In three cases the Board found that the employer had knowledge

of the union's majority status at the time recognition was requested. 8

The

Board decided that because the employer had knowledge of the union's
strength, an election would serve no useful purpose, so it ordered the employer
to bargain. In the fourth case, Summer & Co.,9 the Board lessened the
significance of employer knowledge and refused the union's request for a
bargaining order. Because Summer & Co. was the only Board decision to
deny a union a bargaining order when the employer had knowledge of the

union's majority, it must be analyzed to resolve the undecided issue. Summer
& Co., in turn, must be examined in light of Gissel, the most recent Supreme Court decision on bargaining orders.
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the Court consolidated three similar
cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.10
In each case the union waged an organizational campaign during which a

majority of the employees signed authorization cards. 1 ' On the basis of
the cards, each union demanded recognition by the employer; but each
employer refused, claiming that authorization cards were unreliable indicators
of employee desire. The employers then conducted vigorous antiunion

campaigns which were marked by several unfair labor practices. 1 2 In one
5. Lillian Abrahamson Nursing Home, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (April 2,
1970).
6. 395 U.S. 575, 89 S. Ct. 1918 (1969).
7. See Christensen & Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good Faith Doubt": The
Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions in the NLRA, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 411
(1970), in which the phrase "undecided issue" is used.
8. Redmond Plastics, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Dec. 28, 1970) (see text
accompanying notes 80-83 infra); Wilder Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Aug. 27,
1970) (see text accompanying notes 59-64 infra); Pacific Abrasive Supply Co., 182
N.L.R.B. No. 48 (May 6, 1970) (see text accompanying notes 73-79 infra).
9. 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 7, 1971).
10. Actually four cases were consolidated for consideration: General Steel Prods.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968): NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337
(4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968). The three cases from the
Fourth Circuit are concerned with authorization cards and bargaining orders.
Sinclair, from the First Circuit, involved employer freedom of speech and is not
relevant here.
11. An authorization card designates a union as a bargaining representative.
If 30% of the employees of an appropriate unit sign authorization cards, the union
has established a "showing of interest" and may qualify for a Board-conducted election.
12. The Act establishes the following as employer unfair labor practices:
§ 8 (a) (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights guaranteed in section 7;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to
(3)
(4)

it . . . ;

by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization... ;
to discharge or otherwise discrimnate against an employee because
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case, the union never sought an election; in another, the election was never

held; and in the third the union lost the election. In each case, the Board
ordered the employer to bargain,' 8 and the court of appeals reversed.' 4
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fourth Circuit decision"5 and

established the following criteria for bargaining orders:16 A bargaining
order is proper if the effects of the employer's unfair labor practices tend to
undermine the union's majority strength and impede the election process.'

7

A bargaining order is not proper, however, when the employer's unfair labor
practices have a minimal impact on the election machinery.' 8
The Court justified its use of a bargaining order as a remedy because
it not only redresses past election damage but also deters future employer

he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act;
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a)
The Board found that all three employers violated §§ 8(a)(1).. & (5) while the employers in Gissel and Heck's violated § 8(a)(3).
13. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1966) (election not sought);
Heck's, Inc., 166 N.L.R.B. 186 & 674 (1967) (election never held); General Steel
Prods., 157 N.L.R.B. 636 (1966) (union lost the election).
14. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Heck's,
Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339
(4th Cir. 1968).
15. Each case was remanded to the Board for reconsideration under the guidelines set forth in the opinion. In each case the Board affirmed its previous ruling.
Gissel Packing Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 7 (Dec. 12, 1969); Heck's Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. Nos.
64 and 82 (Dec. 16, 1969 and Jan. 2, 1970); General Steel Prods., 180 N.L.R.B. No.
(5)

8 (Dec. 12, 1969).

16. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 614-15, 89 S. Ct. 1918, 1940-41
(1969).
17. The Fourth Circuit would permit a bargaining order only in exceptional
cases marked by "outrageous" and "pervasive" unfair labor practices such that "their
coercive effects cannot be eliminated by the application of traditional remedies, with
the result that a fair and reliable election cannot be had." NLRB v. S.S. Logan
Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 1967). Other than semantics, there is no
difference between the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit. Both courts agree that
a bargaining order is proper if an election cannot be held; and they agree that a bargaining order is improper if a fair election can be held. The Supreme Court tried to
distinguish its position: "The only effect of our holding is to approve the Board's use
of the bargaining order in less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive practices
which nonetheless still have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede

the election processes."

395 U.S. at 614, 89 S. Ct. at 1940. The confusion would

dissipate if the court held more simply that regardless of the pervasiveness of the
unfair labor practice a bargaining order is proper if, and only if, a fair election cannot
be held. The Fourth Circuit makes the same error as the Supreme Court, assuming
that more pervasive practices have a greater tendency to preclude an election. This
assumption has never been proved. The result has been that the Board does not
examine the effects of an unfair labor practice, but rather examines its pervasiveness.
If an employer's practices are particularly offensive to the Board, a bargaining order
is issued. See Lillian Abrahamson Nursing Home, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (April 2,
1970) (the employer's unfair labor practices were "so flagrant" as to require a bargaining order even in the absence of a § 8(a)(5) charge). If the Board is not
particularly offended, a bargaining order will not issue. See J.A. Conley Co., 181
N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Feb. 12, 1970) (The "few instances of misconduct . . . were not
sufficiently flagrant to prevent the holding of a fair election."); Schuckman Press, Inc.,
181 N.L.R.B. No. 26 (Feb. 16, 1970) (the employer's unfair labor practices "made an
election is less reliable indication of the employees' free choice than the cards.").
See also footnotes 94-96 and accompanying text infra.
18. See J.A. Conley Co., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Feb. 12, 1970).
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misconduct. Further, a bargaining order is not permanent since employees
may disavow a union by filing a decertification petition. Regarding the
claim that authorization cards are inherently unreliable, the Court ruled
that an employee will be bound by the clear language of the card since he
presumably read and understood what he signed. The validity of the card

may be contested by a showing that the language on the card was explicitly

contradicted by statements of the union organizer soliciting signatures. 19
Gissel also marked the end of the good faith doctrine first announced
by the Board in Joy Silk Mills, Inc. 20 Under this doctrine, an employer
could refuse to bargain with the union claiming representative status if
he in good faith doubted the union's majority status. The doctrine was

based on section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA which reads: "It shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees."
This section had been interpreted

as violated if an employer either could not have doubted the union's majority
status 2l at the time the cards were presented or if he committed independent
unfair labor practices subsequent to the union's recognition request. 2' The
new guidelines of Gissel, however, focus on the effects of the employer's
misconduct, not his motivation for refusing to bargain. 28 The court limited

its holding in Gissel to situations in which unfair labor practices have occurred:
Because the employer's refusal to bargain in each of these cases was
accompanied by independent unfair labor practices which tend to preclude the holding of a fair election, we need not decide whether a bargaining order is ever appropriate
in cases where there is no interference
4

with the election process.'

19. The Court thus approved the rule of Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B.
1268 (1964), but warned against a "too easy mechanical application of the rule."
395 U.S. at 606-09, 89 S. Ct. at 1936-37.
20. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See
text accompanying notes 86-88 infra. For a critical analysis of the good faith test see
Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).
21. Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 380 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962); H & W Constr. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. 852 (1966).
22. The employer's misconduct raises the presumption of bad faith. Aaron
Bros. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); John P. Serpa, Inc., 155 N.L.R.B. 99 (1965).
23. May & Bigley, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 102 (Sept. 26, 1969) (unfair labor
practices so coercive that an election is not as good an indicator of employee choice as
the card majority); Garland Knitting Mills, 178 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (Sept. 11, 1969)
(unfair labor practices preclude a fair rerun election).
24. 395 U.S. at 614, 89 S. Ct. at 1940. The Court stated this limitation at
length:
We thus need not decide whether, absent election interference by an employer's
unfair labor practices, he may obtain an election only if he petitions for one himself; whether if he does not, he must bargain with a card majority if the union
chooses not to seek an election; and whether, in the latter situation, he is bound
by the Board's ultimate determination of the card results regardless of his earlier
good-faith doubts, or whether he can still insist on a union-sought election if he
makes an affirmative showing of his positive reasons for believing there is a representation dispute. In short, a union's right to rely on cards as a fully interchangeable substitute for elections where there has been no election interference is
not put into issue here; we need only decide whether the cards are reliable enough
to support a bargaining order where a fair election probably could not have been
held, or where an election that was held was set aside.
Id. at 601 n.18, 89 S. Ct. at 1933 n.18.
The court indicated, however, that a bargaining order may be proper in the ab-
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The Board faced the issue of whether a bargaining order is appropriate

in a case in which there was no interference with the election process. In Summer & Co.,25 the union requested recognition after26 obtaining authorization
Simultaneous with the
cards from all 12 employees in an appropriate unit.
recognition request, the union filed a representation petition. 27 The employer
refused recognition, claiming that the union did not represent a majority.

At a prehearing conference, 28 however, in response to a union request for a

consent election, 29 the employer alleged that the cards were solicited by
supervisors, thus rendering them invalid.30 The hearing officer at the conference ruled that evidence of supervisory taint would not be received because an employer may not challenge the adequacy of the union's showing
of interest. This ruling provoked the employer to say, "[I]f [the Board]

holds an election, the Company will not bargain with the Union."
union then withdrew its representation petition.

The

Later the employer indicated that he would agree to a consent election

if the union submitted a new petition supported by a new 30% showing of
interest. The next day the union presented a statement signed by nine
employees who expressed their desire to be represented by the union. 3 '
sense of employer unfair labor practices:
Almost from the inception of the Act, then, it was recognized that a union did
not have to be certified as the winner of a Board election to invoke a bargaining
obligation; it could establish majority status by other means under the unfair
labor practice provision of section 8(a)(5)-by showing convincing support, for
instance, by a union-called strike or strike vote ....
Id. at 596-97, 89 S. Ct. at 1931.
25. 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 7, 1971). The Board stated: "The resolution
of the instant proceeding now requires the Board to face and decide one of the difficult issues left open in Gissel: whether, absent election interference, an employer
who insists on an election must initiate the election by his own petition." Id. at 9.
26. The NLRA, § 9(c)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(4) (1970), provides for unit
determination by agreement of the parties, subject to the Board's rules and regulations,
or by the Board, § 9(b). The chief criteria of appropriateness are the organizational
history of the employees involved or other employees in the industry; the duties, skills,
wages, and working conditions of the employees; relationship between the proposed
unit and the employer's organization; and desires of the employees. 14 NLRB ANN.
REP. 32-33 (1949).
27. NLRA § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1970). The petition alleges that a
substantial number of employees wish to be represented for collective bargaining and
that their employer refuses to recognize their representative as their exclusive bargaining representative. Other information required in the petition is specified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 102.61 (1971).
28. The purpose of this hearing is to ascertain whether the employer's operations
affect commerce within the meaning of the Act, the appropriateness of the unit, the
existence of a bona fide question of representation, and whether the election would
effectuate the policies of the Act and reflect the free choice of the employees.
29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1971).
29. A consent election provides a prompt and informal method for determining
representation questions. In a consent election the parties agree to the appropriate
unit, the payroll period to be used as the basis of voter eligibility, and the place,
date, and hours of balloting. Procedures are detailed at 29 C.F.R. § 101.19 (1971).
30. NLRB v. Hawthorne Aviation, 406 F.2d 428 (10th Cir. 1969); Pulley v.
NLRB, 395 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1968). Authorization cards solicited by supervisors
may not be counted when the cards are the basis of a bargaining order. The theory
is that supervisors can unduly influence an employee into signing a card. The validity
of the cards cannot be questioned in a repesentation hearing.
31. Two employees, alleged by the employer to be supervisors, did not sign the

736
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The employer again refused recognition, claiming supervisory taint. The
nine employees then went out on strike in support of the union's demand
for recognition. When the strike ended after three and one-half months,
the employer refused to reinstate two workers,8 2 and refused to recognize
the union. Consequently, the union filed charges alleging violations of
section 8(a) (3) of the NLRA, for the wrongful discharge of two employees,
and section 8 (a) (5), for refusal to bargain.88
The Board accepted the trial examiner's determination that the employer committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to reinstate the two4
discharged workers. Under the guidelines of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,
however, the Board concluded that the unfair labor practice did not warrant
a bargaining order: "We conclude that Respondent's violations here did
not have such an impact on the employees that a fair and truly representative
election could not be held."38 The Board next considered whether, "aside
from the rationale of Gissel," a bargaining order was appropriate, or in
other words, whether the absence of effective unfair labor practices precluded the issuance of a bargaining order. The Board split 3-2 on this
question, with the majority refusing to issue a bargaining order.8 6 Both the
majority and dissenters agreed that independent 7 unfair labor practices are
not always a prerequisite for a bargaining order. They also agreed that if
an employer knows that the union represents a majority, he must bargain,
but they could not agree on what constitutes "employer knowledge." 8
The majority opinion, in effect, dispensed with employer knowledge as
a criterion for a possible section 8(a) (5) violation. To reach this position,
the majority first found it necessary to clarify its current practice, which the
Supreme Court discussed in Gissel:
Under the Board's current practice, an employer's good faith doubt is
largely irrelevant, and the key to the issuance of a bargaining order is
the commission of serious unfair labor practices . . . . The Board
pointed out, however, (1) that an employer could not refuse to bargain
if he knew, through a personal poll for instance that a majority of his
employees supported the union, and (2) that an employer could not
refuse recognition initially because of questions as to the appropriatepetition. Two days later, Shafer, who the Board ultimately determined to be a supervisor, resigned.
32. The employer alleged that one had quit and that the other had committed

unlawful acts of violence on the picket line.
33. See note 12 supra.
34. 395 U.S. 575, 615, 89 S. Ct. 1918, 1940 (1969): "[M]inor or less extensive
unfair labor practices, which because of their minimal impact on the election machinery, will not sustain a bargaining order."

35. 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 7, 1971). The Board did not explain why the
violations did not preclude a fair election. It merely stated this as a matter of fact.
This practice of the Board has been criticized. See note 95 infra.
36. Chairman Miller and Board members Jenkins and Kennedy comprised the

majority; Board members Fanning and Brown dissented in a separate opinion. It is
unusual for all five members to hear a case, and this indicates an important decision.
37. "Independent" unfair labor practices refers to violations other than a § 8(a)
(5) violation (refusal to bargain). See note 12 supra.
38. The Board has never proposed a precise definition of what constitutes em-

ployer knowledge.
bargaining order.

Several cases indicate, however, that it is a criterion for issuing a

See, e.g., Redmond Plastics, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Dec. 28,

1970); Wilder Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Aug. 27, 1970); Pacific Abrasive
Supply Co., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (May 6, 1970).
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ness of the unit and then later claim, as an afterthought, that he doubted
the union's strength.3 9
The majority assumes that the statement "if he knew, through a personal poll
for instance," referred to Snow & Sons.40 This assumption is essential, for
the majority then limits 41
Snow & Sons to its facts and virtually eliminates
the concept of knowledge.
In Snow & Sons the Union presented the employer authorization cards
from 31 of 52 employees. The employer initially refused recognition, but
subsequently agreed to have an impartial third party verify the signatures.
The card check revealed that the signatures were authentic, but the employer still refused to recognize the union. Later, 12 employees walked out
in protest and were joined by 7 more the next day. 42 The union later filed
charges alleging a violation of section 8(a) (5). The Board issued a bargaining order, concluding that the employer "had no reasonable doubt as to
the union's majority status" 43 and therefore violated the Act when it refused
to bargain. Thus, the decision turned on the Board's
determination that the
44
employer knew the union represented a majority.
The Board in Summer & Co., however, gave Snow & Sons a slightly
different meaning: the key fact is the employer's breached agreement. 45
It stated that the "case rested not only on the fact of employer knowledge,
but also upon the fact that the employer breached his agreement to permit
'46
majority status to be determined by means other than a Board election."
The Board then distinguished Summer & Co. from Snow & Sons because
in Summer & Co. the employer never agreed to any "legally permissible
means, other than
a Board-conducted election, for resolving the issue of union
' 47
majority status."
The dissenters reject the majority's narrow criterion for issuing bargaining orders. Their view, based on broad interpretation of section 8(a) (5)48
39. 395 U.S. at 594, 89 S. Ct. at 1930 (emphasis by Court).
40. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
41. Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 7, 1971). "There is some question as to whether the summary [of current practice] is entirely accurate. The statement that an employer could not refuse to bargain 'if he knew, through a personal poll
for instance, that a majority of his employees supported the union,' may well have
referred to [Snow & Sons]."
42. The reviewing court placed little reliance on the strike. "[Tihe number of
employees who indicate a willingness to strike is not a reliable guide to the number
represented by the union, at least when an actual count of signed union application
cards is known." Snow v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 687, 693 (9th Cir. 1962).
43. This reference was apparently to Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263
(1949). See text accompanying notes 86-88 infra.
44. Redmond Plastics, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Dec. 28, 1970); Aaron Bros.
Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966); Jem Mfg., 156 N.L.R.B. 643 (1966); Maintenance,
Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299 (1964).
45. The Board's interpretation of Snow & Sons in Summer & Co. is narrow, as it
limits it to its facts. Support for this interpretation can be found in Furr's, Inc.,
157 N.L.R.B. 387 (1966); Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1185 (1966).
See Welles,
The Obligation To Bargain on the Basis of a Card Majority, 3 GA. L. REv. 349, 361
(1969).
46. 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 7, 1971) (emphasis in original).
47. Id.
48. Section 8(a)(5) was given a broad interpretation in H & W Constr. Co.,
161 N.L.R.B. 852 (1966): "The Act imposes an obligation upon an employer to bargain upon request with a union that has been designated by a majority of employees in
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and prior case law, would allow bargaining orders in three instances: when
employer independent unfair practices have impeded the Board's election
process, 49 when no real dispute exists that a union has majority support, 50
and when an employer is convinced (by a card check, independent poll of
employees, or some other means) that a union represents a majority. 51 The
dissent argued that Summer & Co. is controlled by those cases supporting
bargaining orders when no dispute exists concerning a union's majority support. In H & W Construction Co., Inc.,52 the union presented the employer
with authorization from all five employees in the unit and requested recognition. The employer refused recognition, claiming that his company was
not engaged in commerce "within the meaning of the Act." It was not until
the union filed a section 8(a) (5) complaint, however, that the employer
challenged the union's strength. The Board issued a bargaining order because the employer's refusal to bargain was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law, rather than a doubt of the union's majority status.53 The
Board has also issued bargaining orders when the employer's refusal to bargain was based on an erroneous belief that the unit requested by the union
was inappropriate, 54 or that the union representatives were under a legal
disability which prevented them from binding the union, 55 or that his employees were independent contractors.5 6 In each of these cases, the employer did not doubt the union's majority.
After establishing these three criteria for a bargaining order, the dissent
concluded that the employer's refusal to bargain "was grounded solely upon
an erroneous belief that supervisors had influenced the unit employees. '5 7
The opinion noted that only one of the two alleged supervisors actually was
a supervisor, and there was no evidence that he influenced the employees.
Furthermore, neither he nor the other alleged supervisor signed the statement requesting recognition. 55 Moreover, the employee, later found to be
a supervisor, had quit nine days before the strike and so could not have
improperly influenced that decision. Based on these facts and the reasoning
an appropriate unit, and this obligation exists whether or not the union has been
certified by the Board." A narrower interpretation would require an election as the
only means by which a majority can make its designation.
49. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S. Ct. 1918 (1969).
50. 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at 15-16 (June 7, 1971) (dissenting opinion).
51. Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962). The dissent established these three criteria; however if there is "no real dispute" that the union represents a majority, then the employer must be "convinced."
The only distinction in the cases cited by the dissent is that under those cited in the
second instance the employer refused recognition solely for reasons other than a doubt
of majority status. In the third instance, the employer not only refused recognition,
but also breached an agreement to recognize the union.
52. 161 N.L.R.B. 852 (1966).
53. Old King Cole, Inc. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 1958).
54. Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at 16 (June 7, 1971) (dissenting
opinion), citing United Aircraft Corp. v. NLRB, 333 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 910, 85 S. Ct. 893 (1965); Florence Printing Co. v. NLRB,
333 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1964).
55. Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at 16 (June 7, 1971) (dissenting
opinion) citing NLRB v. Burnett Constr. Co., 350 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1965).
56. Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at 16 (June 7, 1971) (dissenting
opinion) citing NLRB v. Keystone Floors, Inc., 306 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1962).
57. Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at 16 (June 7, 1971) (dissenting
opinion).
58. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
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of H & W Construction, the employer's refusal to bargain violated section
8(a)(5). The dissent read H & W Construction as requiring a bargaining
order if the employer's refusal to bargain was founded on reasons other
than a doubt of the union's majority status. Here, the employer's refusal to
bargain was grounded on a misinterpretation of the supervisor's role.
The dissent in Summer & Co. found additional support for its position
in Gissel and a recent Board decision, Wilder Manufacturing Co.5 9 Gissel
reaffirmed the notion that an election is not essential to obligate an employer
to bargain:
[I]t was early recognized that an employer had a duty to bargain whenever the union representative presented 'convincing evidence of majority
support'. . . . [A union] could establish majority status . . . by a
union-called strike or strike vote, or, as here, by possession of cards
60
signed by a majority of the employees ....
Because the union in Summer & Co. clearly established its majority support
by authorization cards, by a statement requesting recognition which nine
employees signed, and by a lengthy strike, the employer was obligated to
bargain.
In Wilder, the union gave the employer authorization cards from 11
of 18 employees in the unit and demanded recognition. Recognition was
refused and later that day, the 11 employees struck. According to the
Board, the issue turned on whether the employer had knowledge of the
union's majority status. "[The issue is] whether, recognizing that there are
no independent unfair labor practices involved, the facts here require a
conclusion that this Employer knew that a majority of his employees
supported the Union and nevertheless refused to bargain. ' 61 In Wilder, the
Board concluded that the employer knew the union represented a majority
because the union had authorization cards from 11 of 18 employees, because
these 11 employees participated in a strike, and because the employer
remarked to a fellow officer that the union had "10 of the 11."62 This
knowledge along with the employer's lack of willingness to seek an election
was sufficient to justify a bargaining order. 68
Wilder is very similar to Summer & Co. In both cases, the unions
completed an organizational drive in a single day; at the time of the demand,
the unions clearly represented a majority; the employers expressed an unwillingness to resort to the election process; and the unions staged a wellsupported strike following the employers refusal to bargain. Based on these
similarities,
the dissent in Summer & Co. concluded that Wilder was con64
trolling.
59.

185 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Aug. 27, 1970).

61.

185 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Aug. 27, 1970) (emphasis by the Board).

60.

395 U.S. at 596-97, 89 S. Ct. at 1931.

62. Id.
63. Id. The Board did not explain how significant the employer's lack of willingness was in deciding the case.
64. Wilder was originally decided before the Gissel opinion was handed down.
In Wilder, the Board dismissed the complaint because there was no showing that the

employer refused to bargain "in bad faith."

precluded a fair election.

Further, there was no interference which

Wilder Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 214 (1968).

The appellate

court, on an appeal by the union, reversed for reconsideration in light of Gissel, just
decided. Textile Workers v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1969). On remand, the
Board reversed its earlier decision, holding that the employer had knowledge of the

union's majority and was therefore obligated to bargain. Wilder Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B.
No. 76 (Aug. 27, 1970).
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Aside from its novel interpretation of knowledge, Summer & Co. is important because of its contrast to other Board decisions. Since the Supreme
Court decided Gissel, several Board decisions have dealt with employer
knowledge. 6 5 Knowledge was the determining factor in Wilder,66 Redmond
Plastics, Inc.,6 7 and Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.68 In each of these cases, a
bargaining order was issued despite the absence of unfair labor practices.
Of these cases, the majority in Summer & Co. cited only Wilder, but failed
to distinguish or overrule it. Since the Board rarely encounters the issue
of employer knowledge, an analysis of these cases is important in determining the current state of the law.
As interpreted in Summer & Co., Wilder was properly decided because
"the employer had independent knowledge of the union's majority status"
and he made no effort to "resort to Board election procedures."' 69 On the
basis of this two-pronged test, Wilder and Summer & Co. are not easily
reconciled. The employer in Summer & Co. was clearly unwilling to resort
to the election process, since at one point he said, "[T]he Board can do
what it wants. If it holds an election, the Company will not bargain with
the Union."17 0 Applying the first prong of the test, however, poses some
difficulties. The Board in Summer & Co. stated it would no longer attempt
to ascertain "the state of employer (a) knowledge and (b) intent at the
time he refuses . . . a union demand for recognition."'' 7
Therefore, the
first prong of the Wilder test, showing employer knowledge, must qualify
under the Snow & Sons formulation-knowledge can exist only when the
employer has agreed to let a means other than a Board election determine
the union's support.7 2 A literal application of the two-pronged Wilder test,
as modified by Summer & Co., would require a union seeking a bargaining
order based on knowledge to prove not only that the employer agreed to be
bound by the results of a nonelection procedure (e.g., a card majority) and
that the procedure established the union's majority but also that the employer
demonstrated an unwillingness to resort to an election. It is highly unlikely,
however, that an employer who agrees to be bound by a card check would
be unwilling to resort to an election. He probably would prefer an election
and the opportunity to campaign but agrees to forego an election because
of union pressure. Conversely, the employer who is unwilling to resort to
an election is even less willing to agree to such procedures as a card check.
Ironically, the facts of neither Wilder nor Snow & Sons would require a
65. Knowledge had been an alternative ground, in addition to unfair labor practices, for issuing a bargaining order. See Escondido Ready Mix Concrete, Inc., 189
N.L.R.B. No. 69 (March 30, 1971); Li'l General Stores, 188 N.L.R.B. No. 117
(Mar. 5, 1971); Davis Wholesale Co., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (Feb. 5, 1970); U-Tote M

of Oklahoma, 179 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (Dec. 2, 1969). Other Board decisions seem to
turn on whether the employer had knowledge. See World Carpets, 188 N.L.R.B. No.
10 (Jan. 26, 1971); Bill Pierre Food, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 155 (Apr. 3, 1970).
66. 185 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (Aug. 27, 1970).

67.
68.

187 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Dec. 28, 1970).
182 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).

69.

190 N.L.R.B. No. 116 (June 7, 1971).

70. Id. at 8.
71. Id. at 10.
72. Using the word knowledge here, as the Board does in Summer & Co., is
misleading. The employer does not really let his knowledge be determined. Rather, if

he agrees to a method other than an election to determine if the union has a majority,
then the Board will not let him renege. The word knowledge is unnecessary in such
a rule.
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bargaining order under this two-pronged test. In Wilder, the employer
never "agreed to be bound"; and in Snow & Sons, the employer was willing
to resort to an election. Apparently, the Board in Summer & Co. was not
really concerned with an employer's "unwillingness" to resort to an election.
Rather, the key inquiry was whether or not he ever agreed to be bound by
some nonelection procedure. If this is accurate, then Wilder, even as modified, is no longer sound, and an examination of employer knowledge, as
the term was used in Wilder, is irrelevant.
Another case where the Board recognized the significance of employer
knowledge was Pacific Abrasive Supply Co. 73 On April 22, 1969, the union
organizers in Pacific Abrasive presented the employer's manager with signed
authorization cards from all four employees in the unit. The manager received the cards and acknowledged the authenticity of the signatures. He
refused, however, to grant recognition, stating that only the company's
president could do so. The next day, the manager had a discussion with
all four employees, and each expressed his desire to be represented by the
union. On April 24, the manager informed the union that the company
would not grant recognition. The following day all four employees went on
strike and formed a picket line. Two employees stopped picketing in the
middle of May, and the other two stopped in early June. The union then
sought a bargaining order, alleging a violation of section 8(a)(5). As
in Wilder 74 and Summer & Co.,75 the Board announced that it was deciding
the undecided issue of Gissel:76 "[The question is] whether a defense of
'good faith doubt' is available to an employer who refuses the union's demand but does not interfere with the election process." 77 The Board answered this question in the negative. If no bona fide dispute exists as to
the union's majority status, then the employer is under an obligation to
bargain. 78 A combination of elements, including the authorization cards,
the manager's discussions, and the strike, proved that there could be no bona
fide dispute in this case. Pacific Abrasive, therefore, stands for the proposition that a bargaining order is proper when the employer has knowledge of
the union's majority status and that the employer's "knowledge" is evaluated
on the facts in each case. 79 This proposition is easily reconcilable with
Wilder, for in both cases a bargaining order issued because of employer
knowledge. In Summer & Co., however, a bargaining order would not
issue, despite employer knowledge.
The most recent case in which the Board discussed employer knowledge
is Redmond Plastics, Inc.80 In Redmond, the union began its organizational
drive on March 27 and by March 29 had obtained a card majority. A few
73.
74.

182 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
See text accompanying note 61 supra.

75. See note 25 supra.
76. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
77. 182 N.L.R.B. at 330.
78. Id. The court explained as follows:
We find on these facts that 'any bona fide dispute as to the existence of the required majority of eligible employees' which might have existed at the time the
Union made its demand upon Respondent [Employer] was dissipated by the subsequent discussion between . . . [the manager] and the employees, and the fact,
known to Respondent, that all four unit employees were on the picket line.
Id. at 331.
79. See, e.g., Acker Indus., 184 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (July 7, 1970) (dissenting
opinion).
80.

187 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Dec. 28, 1970).
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days later, the union organizers presented the employer with the cards,
while 12 of 21 employees in the unit remained outside the plant. The employer acknowledged the union's majority and agreed to bargain. He refused to sign a recognition agreement, however, until he had discussed the
matter with other company officers. 8 ' Later that day the employer again
refused to sign the agreement and suggested that the union seek a consent
election. The Board issued a bargaining order based on Snow & Sons
because the employer reneged on an agreement, and on Wilder because the
employer had no doubt as to the union's majority.8 2 The employer was
denied an election because its only function is to resolve legitimate disputes
and no legitimate dispute existed. The Board would not allow the election
process to be used as a "loophole in the law" through which an employer
could delay his bargaining obligations and thus deny
his employees their
83
statutory rights under section 7 to bargain collectively.
In Summer & Co. the focus seemed to be on the employer's right to an
election regardless of knowledge; in Redmond the focus was on the union's
right to recognition when no doubt existed as to its strength. A more
significant change in focus appears when Wilder, Pacific Abrasive, and
Redmond are considered together. All three cases indicate the Board's
willingness to issue a bargaining order when no dispute exists as to the
union's majority. By rejecting this criterion, the majority in Summer & Co.
has developed a new policy.
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., the Court dispensed with the good faith
standard as a criterion for bargaining orders, at least when unfair labor
practices have occurred. 84 But since that decision was explicitly limited to
cases involving unfair labor practices, the vitality of the standard in other
situations remained in doubt.8 5 The majority in Summer & Co. rejected
the good faith standard completely: "We decline, in summary, to reenter the
'good faith' thicket of Joy Silk, which we announced to the Supreme Court
in Gissell we had 'virtually abandoned . . . altogether.' "s
Arguably,
however, the good faith question was not presented in Summer & Co. For
if the record indicated that the employer knew or must have known that the
union represented a majority, an inquiry into his subjective feelings is irrelevant. Conceptually, a "good faith doubt" and a "bona fide dispute" are not
synonymous. In the former, the Board must inquire into the reasons the
employer declined recognition. If, for instance, he wished to gain time to dissipate the union's strength, or if he simply rejected the collective bargaining
concept, then he would be guilty of bad faith.8 7 But determining whether
81.

Chairman Miller, in his dissenting opinion, argued that this fact indicated

that the employer never agreed to recognize the union.
82. Redmond Plastics, Inc., 187 N.L.R.B. No. 60 (Dec. 28, 1970).

The Board

stated:
[I]t is difficult to see that the . . . [Employer's] request for an election indicated
such genuine willingness to resolve 'any lingering doubts' concerning the Union's
majority when, in fact, no such doubts lingered ....
[The employer,] even after
requesting an election, repeated that he had no doubts as to the Union's majority.

Id. at 8.
83. Id.
84.
85.
Gestalt
(1970).
86.
87.

See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
See Christensen & Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good Faith Doubt": The
of Required Recognition of Union in the NLRA, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 411
190 N.L.R.B. No. 116, at 11 (June 7, 1971).
Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949).
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a bona fide dispute exists requires no such inquiry. All that is required is an
analysis of the facts. If, for instance, all four employees in a unit sign
authorization cards and participate in a strike, there can be no bona fide
dispute as to the union's status.8 8 The Board need not determine whether
the employer had a good faith doubt, but rather, whether he could have
any doubt.
A bargaining order based on employer knowledge raises several issues.
Arguably, a Board election should be held to afford the employer an opportunity to campaign regardless of the union's card majority and apparent
strength.8 9 The employers in Gissel contended that employees could not
make an informed choice because the card campaign was over before the
employer could present his side.90 To this, the Court replied that the union
normally informs the employer of its organizational drive. 91 Thus the employer has ample opportunity to campaign against the union, and the subsequent employee choice, be it through authorization cards or a strike, is
likely to be a free choice. Significantly, the Court's reply was not based
on empirical research, but rather on an unsupported assumption that employers are usually aware of union campaigns. If this assumption proves
false, then the policy of promoting free choice has suffered, for the employees' choice after a fair campaign may be quite different.
Justifying a bargaining order predicated on employer knowledge, as the
dissent in Summer & Co. did, assumes that a fair representation campaign
would not change employee sentiments. Some support for this assumption
may be found in Professor Bok's article on campaign tactics, in which he
observed that the employee's vote is often not based on logical reasoning,
but is rather "a reaction to the pressures of the moment. ' 92 But again, if
this assumption proves false, the policy of free choice is frustrated.
Finally, a bargaining order based on employer knowledge relies heavily
on the proposition that the intent of the Act is to require an employer to
bargain with a union that presented clear and convincing evidence of majority
support. 93 Arguably, however, this may require a bargaining order based
on authorization cards alone, for clear, unambiguous cards from a majority
of employees may be convincing evidence. To avoid such a result, the
convincing evidence must be a result of free choice. If a majority of the
employees picketed in support of a union, this alone would not be sufficient
evidence of majority support unless the decision to strike was shown to be
a free and reasoned one. No such showing was made by the union in
Summer & Co.; however, no such showing was required.
In conclusion, the Board's current practice on issuing bargaining orders
appears inconsistent with its policy of promoting employee free choice. An
examination of cases decided by the Board since Gissel reveals that the
Board has often issued a bargaining order when unfair labor practices have
88.
89.

Pacific Abrasive Supply Co., 182 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (May 6, 1970).
See Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805 (1966).

90. 395 U.S. at 602-03, 89 S. Ct. at 1934.
91. The union later may have to prove employer awareness to substantiate allegations of unfair labor practices.
92. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representative Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV.L. REv. 38, 50 (1964).
93. See, e.g., NLRB v. Marsellus Vault & Sales, 431 F.2d 933, 938 (2d Cir. 1970),
enforcing 170 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (Mar. 29, 1968). -"Under the circumstances of this
case the Company was under a duty to bargain collectively with the Union, for the
Union had shown 'convincing evidence of majority support'."
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occurred without the required showing of why a fair election cannot be
held. 94 This practice has been criticized " because it is contrary to the
96
guidelines established in Gissel.
In Gissel, the Court explicitly instructed
the Board to ascertain the effects of employer misconduct on the election

process. Because the Board has failed to make such findings, bargaining
orders may have been issued in cases in which the unfair labor practices did
not disturb the election process or the union recognized did not represent
a majority.
The Board will issue a bargaining order if the employer has agreed to
be bound by a card check and later reneges on his agreement. 97 But this
approach does not promote employee free choice, for it should not matter

if the employer has made such an agreement. The crucial inquiry in such
cases should be into the employees' actions, not the employer's.

If the card

majority was preceded by a campaign in which both management and labor
participated and the employees' choice was a free and reasoned one then a

bargaining order may be proper regardless of whether or not the employer
agreed to be bound.
This inquiry is also necessary for cases like Summer & Co., Wilder,
Pacific Abrasive, and Redmond. Mere proof of employer knowledge is insufficient, for of what does the employer have knowledge? All he really

knows is that at one point the union represented a majority of his employees. More important, however, is whether each employee made a free
and reasoned choice. In small units, in which the employer has had an
opportunity to discuss the issues with his employees, the employer may
94. Lilliam Abrahamson Nursing Home, 181 N.L.R.B. No. 148 (April 2, 1970);
New Alaska Dev. Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (Jan. 27, 1970); Renner Plumbing,
Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (Nov. 19, 1969); Garland Knitting Mills, 178 N.L.R.B.
No. 62 (Sept. 11, 1969); Marie Phillips, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (Sept. 5, 1969).
In the following cases, the Board held that the unfair labor practices had a minimal
effect on the election process. But again, there was no showing of the precise effect,
if any, that the unfair labor practices had on the election process: Dent Poultry Co.,
188 N.L.R.B. No. 112 (Feb. 25, 1971); J.A. Conley Co., 181 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (Feb. 12,
1970); Central Soya of Canton, 180 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (Jan. 6, 1970); Blade-Tribune
Publishing Co., 180 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (Dec. 16, 1969); Stoutco, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B.
No. 11 (Dec. 15, 1969); Schrementi Bros., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (Dec. 3, 1969);
Seymour Transfer Co., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 5 (Oct. 10, 1969).
95. See NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. General
Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971); Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 76 L.R.R.M.
2689 (7th Cir. 1971). See also, e.g., NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 414
F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1969), in which the court was particularly adamant in requiring
the Board to substantiate its bargaining order. The alleged unfair labor practices occurred in 1965, and the Board issued a bargaining order the following year. American
Cable Systems, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 332 (1966). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit refused enforcement, remanding for further consideration in light of Gissel.
NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 414 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1969). On remand,
the Board affirmed its prior order, holding that Gissel required a bargaining order.
But the Board failed to show why a fair election could not be held. American Cable
Systems, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. No. 149 (Dec. 3, 1969). The employer again appealed to
the circuit court, and again enforcement was denied. The court, with rather strong
language, remanded the case and instructed the Board to demonstrate the effects of the
unfair labor practices. NLRB v. American Cable Systems, Inc., 427 F.2d 446 (5th
Cir. 1970).
96. See note 17 and accompanying text supra.
97. Snow & Sons, 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir.
1962). See text accompanying notes 40-47 supra.
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be aware of their decision process. If he knows that his employees understand his arguments but still prefer the union and would vote for one in
an election, then he has sufficient knowledge to justify a bargaining order.
Summer & Co., however, rejects a bargaining order in such instances, for
the Board will "no longer attempt to ascertain the state of employer . . .
knowledge." Ironically, a bargaining order would be proper if the employer

agreed to be bound by a card check, while remaining completely ignorant of
how his employees reached their decision.
If the Board's policy is to encourage secret ballot elections, then it
should do so consistently. It should ascertain if an election can be held
despite unfair labor practices; it should require an election despite a reneged
agreement. It would follow then that an election is necessary regardless of
employer knowledge.
M.J.L.

LABOR LAW-THE ENFORCEMENT POWER OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
UNDER SECTION 402 OF THE LMRDA-Hodgson v. Local 6799, United

Steelworkers of America, 403 U.S. 333, 91 S. Ct. 1841 (1971).
In response to reports of "instances of breach of trust, corruption . . .
and other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical
conduct"1 in the labor and management fields, Congress enacted the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).2 Among
the new restrictions and requirements to which unions were subjected were
the election provisions of title IV.s Section 401 contained the substantive guarantees designed to provide free and democratic elections. Section 402 established a statutory method to enforce the section 401 provisions. Although this method vested wide enforcement power in the
Secretary of Labor, 4 the exact scope of his power was not apparent from
the language of section 402. 5
1. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) § 2(b), 29
U.S.C. § 401(b) (1970).
2. LMRDA §§ 1-705, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
3. Id. §§ 401-04, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83.
4. "Congress deliberately gave exclusive enforcement authority to the Secretary
having decided to utilize the special knowledge and discretion of the Secretary of Labor
in order best to serve the public interest." Wirtz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389
U.S. 463, 473, 88 S. Ct. 643, 649 (1968), citing Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134,
140, 85 S. Ct. 292, 296 (1964).
5. Besides § 401 and § 402, title IV of the LMRDA contained two other sections. Section 404 dealt with the date on which the provisions were to take effect and
is no longer relevant. Section 403 dealt with alternative methods of correcting
alleged union election abuses. Although it preserved "existing rights and remedies to
enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with respect to elections
prior to the conduct thereof," it provided that the remedy afforded by this title
for
"challenging an election already conducted shall be exclusive."
Prior to the enactment of the LMRDA, however, courts were generally not accessible to parties complaining of internal union abuses. For a thorough discussion of the availability of
pre-LMRDA union election relief see R. SLOVENKO, SYMPOSIUM ON THE LABOR-

